

Measuring Populist Attitudes in the U.S. Presidential Race

A Survey of the American Public



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Measuring Populist Attitudes in the U.S. Presidential Race

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Executive Summary

This report contains the results of a survey conceived and written by the Institute for Modern Authoritarianism and fielded nationwide from Nov. 17 to 27, 2023, as a supplement to the America’s Political Pulse survey administered weekly by the Dartmouth College-based Polarization Research Lab. The survey had 1,000 respondents and a standard margin of error of 3.1% at a 95% confidence level.

In this initial, exploratory survey, we incorporated insights from the academic literature on populism to construct a strict model under which respondents needed to hold all three of the populist attitudes we tested to qualify as “populists.” We found that while only a 5% minority of Americans displayed all these attitudes, a majority of these—almost four times as many—were supporters of Donald Trump, as opposed to Joe Biden, with populists comprising about 10.3% of Trump’s support and about 2.5% of Biden’s.* Both sets of populists had unusually high levels of affective political polarization.†

Other key findings were:

- Large majorities of not just Trump supporters, but also Biden supporters were harshly critical of federal government elites—both elected officials and the unelected officials in the bureaucracy. This feeling extended well beyond those who qualified as populists.
- Given claims that their political opponents engaged in partisan law enforcement, pluralities of both Biden supporters and Trump supporters agreed they trusted their candidates “as president to decide when to follow the law and when to ignore it to achieve justice.”
- A majority of Trump supporters saw themselves as primarily loyal not to Trump personally, but rather to his policy agenda.
- Trump supporters, compared with Biden supporters, were much more likely to personally identify with their candidate’s goals and feel that he identified with them—views consistent with a populist dynamic.
- Majorities of Trump populists described themselves as “born again,” regarded religion as very important in their lives, and held conservative views on several hot-button cultural issues surveyed, such as transgender athletes.
- Trump populists also exhibited much lower levels of general trust in others than Biden supporters, other Trump supporters and Americans as a whole.

* Statistical tests indicate with 95% confidence that there are in the U.S. roughly two to nine times as many populists, by our definition, supporting Trump as Biden, and that the percentage of populists among Trump’s supporters is roughly two to nine times the percentage of populists among Biden’s supporters. The confidence intervals for these two calculations differ slightly; see page 18 below.

† The finding of higher affective polarization for populists than for nonpopulists among Biden and Trump supporters was statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. Affective political polarization was calculated through an approach employed by the Polarization Research Lab.

Encouragingly, we found that despite all the political strife over immigration, most Americans did not express anti-immigrant attitudes, including Trump supporters, though they were much more likely than Biden supporters to do so. A 67% majority of Trump supporters, however, did express concern over the failure of national political leaders to control undocumented immigration, which they saw as intentional—a result that may reflect the influence of the so-called “Great Replacement Theory” (see page 10). In contrast, just 9% of Biden supporters felt the same.

Introduction: The Survey's Goal

In everyday conversation, populism is often defined by the rule of “I know it when I see it.” Scholars, however, have worked to describe populism more precisely and track its influence. One approach to this task has been to monitor the popularity and influence of political parties that have openly represented or drawn on populist movements.³ Another approach attempts to measure the prevalence of populist attitudes in the public, as opposed to the strength of any “populist party” or “populist leader” they might support.⁴ Both methods must grapple to varying degrees with the question of what constitutes populism.⁵

The survey of U.S. adults described in this report adopted the latter, demand-side approach, and tested potential populist attitudes among the public.⁶ The survey was conceived and written by the Institute for Modern Authoritarianism and fielded nationwide from Nov. 17 to 27, 2023, as a supplement to the America’s Political Pulse survey administered weekly by the Dartmouth College-based Polarization Research Lab.⁷ The survey had 1,000 respondents and a standard margin of error of 3.1% at a 95 percent confidence level.

This initial exercise was largely exploratory—an effort to operationalize scholarly descriptions into a tool for tracking populism in the field. Specifically, the survey attempted to detect three of four attitudes—or political dynamics—frequently attributed in the scholarly literature to supporters of populist movements. In our survey, supporters of Republican Donald Trump in the upcoming presidential election were more likely than supporters of Democrat Joe Biden to display all three populist attitudes, and Biden and Trump supporters exhibiting all three attitudes displayed considerably higher levels of

³ See, for instance, the *Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index: 2019* (Stockholm, Sweden: Timbro, 2019), available at <http://tinyurl.com/23d5fye2>, which contains data on European populist political parties from 1980 onward. A particularly comprehensive and sophisticated study of populism’s reach globally was recently conducted by Harvard University’s Pippa Norris; see Pippa Norris, “Measuring Populism Worldwide,” *Party Politics* 26, no. 6 (November 1, 2020): 697–717, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068820927686>.

⁴ See, for example, Agnes Akkerman, Cas Mudde, and Andrej Zaslove, “How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters,” *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 9 (2014): 1324–1353.

⁵ See, for example, Timbro’s discussion of the elements of populism in *Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index*, 9–12, and Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove, “How Populist Are the People?” 1326–1328.

⁶ In addition to the discussions cited in the previous note, a general review of recent populist movements and the distinguishing features of populism can be found in Bican Şahin and Radu-Nicola Delicote, eds., *A Liberal Response to the Populist Threat* (Çankaya, Turkey: Freedom Research, 2020), particularly Tom G. Palmer, “The Ideology of Populism,” 15–21, *ibid.*; see also Isaiah Berlin, “To Define Populism” (remarks from London School of Economics Conference on Populism, May 20–21, 1967, available from The Isaiah Berlin Literary Trust, 2013, at <http://tinyurl.com/432dtt42>).

⁷ See “America’s Political Pulse Survey,” Polarization Research Lab, accessed January 31, 2024, <https://polarizationresearchlab.org/americas-political-pulse/>; “About our lab,” Polarization Research Lab, accessed January 31, 2024, <https://polarizationresearchlab.org/about-our-lab/>. The Polarization Research Lab sponsored the survey time-sharing arrangement: see “PASTS: Partisan Animosity Survey Time Sharing,” Polarization Research Lab, accessed January 31, 2024, <https://polarizationresearchlab.org/request-for-proposals/>.

affective political polarization⁸ than other Biden and Trump supporters—a finding suggestive of the political passions of populism.

The Survey Framework: The Four Populist Attitudes

The four populist dynamics mentioned above are that members of populist movements:

1. feel an unusually direct connection with a populist leader or his or her agenda, experiencing a sense that this leader understands them and will defend their interests—that he or she is, despite any differences in social status, like them;
2. see themselves, or people like themselves, as oppressed, harmed or ignored by powerful elites, often government elites, who act against their interests;
3. perceive themselves, or people like themselves, as losing wealth, status or influence to others favored or unchecked by the elites—perhaps immigrants or others who, unlike people like themselves, are not “real” or “true” members of the nation;
4. support this populist leader, because of the threats they sense and because of his or her ability to inveigh against those threats, in overriding institutional checks on the state’s power to exert the popular will.

By definition, in this view, populism, whether from the political left or political right, threatens the constraints that liberal democracies characteristically place on pure majoritarianism.

In our 10-question survey, we tested for the first, second and fourth of these attitudes, largely omitting the third due to the difficulty of determining and testing, particularly in a short questionnaire, the broad range of “social others” whom the respondents might have identified. We plan to explore this attitude in a future survey, but we did include in this poll a question testing various attitudes toward immigrants, whose background and intentions Donald Trump has questioned in the past.⁹

In processing the results of survey, we calculated the number of individuals among both Biden supporters and Trump supporters who exhibited all three attitudes. We also looked at how many held at least two. While a populist movement might derive energy and direction from people who held all three, it seems likely enough that a populist movement, like all

⁸ Affective polarization was calculated by an approach used by the Polarization Research Lab; see “Affective Polarization in the US,” Polarization Research Lab, accessed January 31, 2024, <http://tinyurl.com/445bzyfb>.

⁹ Marianne LeVine and Meryl Kornfield, “Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Onslaught Sparks Fresh Alarm Heading into 2024,” *Washington Post*, October 16, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/2023/10/12/trump-immigrants-comments-criticism/>; Amber Phillips, “‘They’re Rapists.’ President Trump’s Campaign Launch Speech Two Years Later, Annotated,” *Washington Post*, accessed January 19, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/06/16/theyre-rapists-presidents-trump-campaign-launch-speech-two-years-later-annotated/>.

political movements, would gain strength and size from a coalition of people who share some—though not necessarily all—attitudes in common.

The question responses used to identify respondents who appeared to exhibit each of the three attitudes is explained in the next section, but a table summarizing the approach appears on page 24. This approach was decided in advance of fielding the survey. An appendix starting on page 23 presents the topline results and standard crosstabulations for all 10 of the ISMA survey questions by age, gender, race, education, marital status, family income, party, ideology, and Trump supporters, Biden supporters and those who supported neither.

The next section reviews the topline results, as well as the results for Biden and Trump supporters, for each of the 10 survey questions. That section is followed by a discussion of the survey’s preliminary findings on populism (see page 16).

A Review of the Question Results

Because the relationship between populist leaders and their supporters is an important element of a populist movement, the survey’s first question asked whom the respondent would probably vote for if the election were held tomorrow and the Republican and Democratic candidates were Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Biden had a slight advantage, 39% to 37%, over Trump in our survey (see table below), though the difference was within the margin of error. Approximately 24% of respondents did not commit to either candidate, with 6% saying they were unsure, 6% saying they probably wouldn’t vote, and 12% saying they would vote for someone else.

[Asked of everyone.]

- 1) If the upcoming presidential election were held tomorrow and the Republican and Democratic candidates were Donald Trump and Joe Biden, whom would you probably vote for?

Democrat Joe Biden	39
Republican Donald Trump	37
I would vote for someone else	12
I’m not sure	6
I don’t think I would vote	6

Note: Order of first two response options rotated during survey.

Testing for the First Populist Attitude: Personal Connection (Questions 2, 3a and 3b)

The second question was asked only of those who said they would vote for Biden or Trump in the first question. It began investigating the first populist dynamic by seeing whether the primary reason a respondent would vote for their candidate was because they felt a strong personal connection to him or his agenda.

The next question in the survey thus listed several reasons Biden and Trump supporters might back their candidate and asked them which was their *primary* reason (see table on next page). In general, a 39% plurality responded that the primary reason they would vote for their candidate was because they supported their candidates' policy agenda, while another 34% said that they mostly didn't want the other candidate to win. Another 19% said they were voting primarily out of party loyalty; and just 3% said their primary motive was feeling a personal connection with the candidate.

These cumulative figures, however, mask key differences between Biden and Trump voters. Notably, a 54% majority of Trump backers said they primarily supported Trump's policy agenda, while just 25% of Biden backers said the same of Biden. Rather, a 46% plurality of Biden supporters said they were mostly voting against Trump, and another 24% of Biden supporters said they backed Biden out of party loyalty. Thus, 70% of Biden's support came not from strong personal feelings for him or his agenda, but from the impersonal motives of party loyalty and antipathy to Trump. Just 2% of Biden supporters said the primary reason they backed him was because "I feel a personal connection with him."

Interestingly, just 5% of Trump supporters said the same of Trump—a result that suggests it's a mistake to think of Trump voters as seeing themselves mostly as loyal to Trump personally, rather than responsive to his agenda. Still, in contrast to Biden's backers, 59% of Trump's backers connected their support of Trump more directly to him personally or his proposed agenda, rather than less personal factors like party loyalty or opposition to Biden.

To test whether backing for Trump and Biden involved more than just a defensible policy platform, a follow-up tandem of questions asked Trump and Biden voters directly about the strength of their views of their candidate to see whether it might represent the more unusual enthusiasm typically associated with populism. These questions, the third and fourth in the survey, asked whether the respondent agreed that their preferred candidate (Biden or Trump) was "the only recent candidate who understands people like me," and whether he's "the only recent candidate who will actually fight for people like me."

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

2) Which of the following would you say is the PRIMARY reason you would vote for [preferred candidate: Joe Biden/Donald Trump]? Choose only one.

	<u>All</u>	<u>Biden supporters</u>	<u>Trump supporters</u>
I support his policy agenda	39	25	54
I don't want [preferred candidate's opponent: Donald Trump/Joe Biden] to be elected president	34	46	23
I am a [preferred candidate's party: Democrat/Republican] and prefer to vote for my party's candidate	19	24	14
I feel a personal connection with him	3	2	5
None of the above really describes why I would vote for [preferred candidate: Joe Biden/Donald Trump]	4	3	5

Note: Respondent's answer to question 1 determined their preferred candidate. Order of first four response options randomized during survey.

Most Biden and Trump supporters generally endorsed these positive descriptions of their candidates (see table on next page). By agreeing or strongly agreeing, 57% approved the statement that their candidate had an unusual understanding of people like them, and 67% approved the statement that their candidate was unusually willing to fight for people like them.

Again, there was a noticeable difference between Trump and Biden backers. Among Trump supporters, 26% strongly agreed that Trump “is the only recent candidate who understands people like me,” with a total of 63% either agreeing or strongly agreeing. Among Biden supporters, in contrast, just 16% strongly agreed, with a total of 51% agreeing or strongly agreeing.

The difference was yet greater on the follow-up question: 41% of Trump supporters strongly agreed that Trump “is the only recent candidate who will actually fight for people like me,” with a total of 77% agreeing or strongly agreeing. Among Biden supporters, the numbers,

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while not low, were clearly lower: just 21% strongly agreed, with a total of 58% agreeing or strongly agreeing. Overall, then, Trump supporters, more than Biden supporters, seemed to feel that their candidate identified with them, both in understanding them and in his willingness to fight on their behalf.

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

3) When you think about [*preferred candidate*: Donald Trump/Joe Biden], do you agree or disagree with the following?

	<u>Strongly agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neither agree nor disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly disagree</u>
a) He's the <u>only</u> recent candidate who understands people like me	21	36	25	13	5
<i>Biden Supporters</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>Trump Supporters</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>3</i>
b) He's the <u>only</u> recent candidate who will actually fight for people like me	31	36	19	10	4
<i>Biden Supporters</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Trump Supporters</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>2</i>

Note: Respondent's answer to question 1 determined their preferred candidate. Response options began with "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree" at random during survey.

The first of the four populist attitudes mentioned earlier focused on the sense of personal identification supporters had in a populist leader and his or her goals. We defined people who exhibited signs of this first attitude as those who either: 1) said that their primary reason for voting their preferred candidate was feeling a personal connection with him, or 2) said that their primary reason was their support for his policy agenda *and* that they strongly agreed both that he was the only recent candidate who understood people like them and who would actually fight for people like him. On this definition, 14% of Biden and Trump

voters on the whole qualified, though just 7% of Biden supporters did, compared to 21% of Trump supporters.

These responses do indicate more potential populist sentiment among Trump supporters than among Biden supporters. That said, it's important to recognize that exhibiting a single possible populist attitude does not make one a "populist." Under our model, populism involves a series of attitudes and dynamics that include supporting a violation of the constraints imposed on political power by liberal democracy. One might identify with a leader or criticize national elites without approving that leader's persecuting those elites or violating the federal government's system of checks and balances. In searching for likely populists, we are interested in a *combination* of views that could prove problematic.

Testing for the Second Populist Attitude: Cynicism Toward Elites (Questions 4a and 4b)

The next two questions in the survey were asked of all respondents and tested peoples' views of government elites in Washington, D.C. Both were set off by a preamble about people having "expressed concern recently that the elites who run America's most powerful institutions are losing touch with the rest of society and starting to serve their own selfish interests more than they are the public."

The first question then asked whether the respondent agreed with the statement, "America's political elites among its national elected officials have often harmed the interests of Americans like me in pursuit of their own selfish interests." The second question asked the same thing about "America's bureaucratic elites among the unelected officials in the federal government."

Given the strong language, with elites harming "the interests of Americans like me" while pursuing "their own selfish interests," the responses were striking. Only 4% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement about America's political elites, and just 7% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement about America's federal bureaucratic elites (see table on next page). Instead, 74% agreed or strongly agreed with the claim about political elites, while 69% agreed or strongly agreed with the claim about bureaucratic elites. In both cases, pluralities of Americans—39% and 36%, respectively—strongly agreed.

This disapproval was felt by large majorities of both Biden and Trump supporters: 73% and 82% agreed or strongly agreed, respectively, with the statement about national political elites, while 66% and 78% agreed or strongly agreed, respectively, with the statement about federal bureaucratic elites. Even so, in both cases, the level of disapproval was higher among Trump supporters. The degree of disapproval was as well: On the question of political elites, a 51% majority of Trump supporters strongly agreed with the claim, while just 30% of Biden supporters did so. On bureaucratic elites, 49% of Trump supporters strongly agreed, while just 29% of Biden supporters did so. In both cases, Biden supporters were more likely to simply agree than strongly agree, whereas Trump supporters were more inclined to strongly agree than simply agree.

[Asked of everyone.]

- 4) Some people have expressed concern recently that the elites who run America’s most powerful institutions are losing touch with the rest of society and starting to serve their own selfish interests more than they are the public. When you think of America’s elites, do you agree or disagree with the following?

	<u>Strongly agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neither agree nor disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly disagree</u>
a) America’s political elites among its national elected officials have often harmed the interests of Americans like me in pursuit of their own selfish interests	39	35	22	3	1
<i>Biden Supporters</i>	30	43	22	4	1
<i>Trump Supporters</i>	51	31	14	3	1
b) America’s bureaucratic elites among the unelected officials in the federal government have often harmed the interests of Americans like me in pursuit of their own selfish interests	36	33	25	5	2
<i>Biden Supporters</i>	29	37	23	8	3
<i>Trump Supporters</i>	49	30	19	2	1

Note: Response options began with “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree” at random during survey.

The second of the four populist attitudes described earlier involves a criticism or resentment of societal elites, particularly in government. We thus defined respondents who strongly agreed with one or both of these statements as appearing to exhibit that populist attitude.

Under this definition, 43% of the American public qualified, including 36% of Biden supporters and a majority—55%—of Trump supporters.

This difference between Biden and Trump supporters is perhaps unsurprising given that part of Trump’s appeal as a candidate is the perception that he wasn’t part of the Washington, D.C., political establishment—i.e., the political elite.¹⁰ He has also made a point of saying he will “drain the [political] swamp” in Washington, D.C., and fight “the deep state,” of which the federal bureaucracy is a part.¹¹ Trump has, then, openly criticized both elites.

Still, one concern is whether testing attitudes toward these two elites might skew our measure of populism away from America’s political liberals and progressives, who are more likely to vote for Democrats, and toward America’s political conservatives, who are more likely to vote for Republicans. American conservatives have often expressed more concern about the size and reach of government, particularly the federal government, home to the two sets of elites tested in the survey.

But suspicion of the federal government has existed among political liberals and progressives, too, from protesters of the Vietnam War to the Occupy Wall Street movement. Indeed, while the latter focused its criticism on corporate elites, its members also saw federal politics and federal regulation as having been corrupted by corporate money and lobbying; the movement even gave birth to the regulatory watchdog organization Occupy the SEC.¹²

Suspicion of nongovernment elites will often lead to skepticism of government elites as well, since the government elites can be seen as having failed to prevent—or even having enabled—the nongovernment elite’s perceived abuses. That said, we plan in longer, future surveys to test attitudes toward elites in business, religion and other nongovernment sectors that have been criticized by members of America’s political left.

A Tentative Testing for the Third Populist Attitude: Immigrants and Immigration (Question 5)

In this survey, we did not try to fully test the presence of the third populist attitude described on page 2—i.e., a perception of losing out to a group favored or unchecked by the elites and viewed as not being “real” or “true” members of the nation. This socially “othered” group varies depending on the country and the populist movement itself, and our survey’s brevity precluded determining and testing which potential “others” might be the focal point of a populist frustration in America at present.

But as mentioned earlier, we did test people’s views of immigrants, given Donald Trump’s public comments about them. The question was posed to all respondents,

¹⁰ See, for example, Eden Villalovas, “Trump ‘Outsider’ Status Gives Him Another Leg up on Challengers,” September 26, 2023, <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/trump-outsider-status-gives-him-another-leg-up-on-challengers/ar-AA1hiIgf>.

¹¹ See, for example, Aila Slisco, “Trump to ‘Dismantle Deep State’ with ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission,’” *Newsweek*, March 21, 2023, <https://www.newsweek.com/trump-dismantle-deep-state-truth-reconciliation-commission-1789374>.

¹² See, for example, “Some Say Occupy Wall Street Did Nothing. It Changed Us More Than We Think,” *TIME*, November 15, 2021, <https://time.com/6117696/occupy-wall-street-10-years-later/>; “Occupy the SEC,” OSEC, January 26, 2024, <https://occupythesecc.org/>.

asking them whether “immigrants reject core American values,” “immigrants take jobs from American workers,” and “immigrants weaken the American economy, reducing our wealth.”

The answers did not provide evidence of widespread anti-immigrant feeling, despite some partisan differences. Only 22% of respondents generally agreed that immigrants take jobs from American workers; 18%, that immigrants weaken the American economy, reducing our wealth; and 17%, that immigrants reject core American values. Only 8% chose all three, and 50% disagreed with not just these statements, but an additional statement about politicians and undocumented immigrants discussed below. There were partisan differences—nearly a third of Trump supporters agreed with each of the three statements, but they were different thirds for each, and only 14% Trump supporters agreed with all three views.

The area of greater skepticism and partisan difference came with the statement, “Our political leaders in Washington, D.C., have intentionally failed to reduce undocumented immigration because they want more immigrants to enter the country”: 36% agreed, though this was dominated by Trump supporters, 67% of whom agree, compared to just 9% of Biden supporters. This cynicism may result from frustration over the persistence of the issue and may also reflect the influence of the so-called “Great Replacement Theory,” an idea that has in recent years gained exposure on such media outlets as Fox News and Newsmax.¹³ Under this theory, government leaders foster immigration, even undocumented immigration, in order to overwhelm the political and cultural influence of native-born—sometimes specifically white—Americans. One element of this view is that the occurrence of undocumented immigration is intentional.

Yet even the disapproval expressed by Trump supporters in this question may not be completely “anti-immigrant” per se. The question deals specifically with undocumented immigrants, not immigrants in general. It also asks about the failures of political leaders in Washington, D.C.—a group that 82% of Trump backers had earlier agreed were self-interested and harmful to people like them. To the extent Trump supporters’ responses indicate an anti-immigrant populist attitude, they seem to be linked to provisions of immigration law and a perceived double-dealing by the country’s political leadership.

¹³ See “‘The Great Replacement:’ An Explainer,” Anti-Defamation League, April 19, 2021, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/great-replacement-explainer>; “The ‘Great Replacement’ Theory, Explained,” National Immigration Forum, December 2021, <https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Replacement-Theory-Explainer-1122.pdf>; Solange Reyner, “Rasmussen Poll: 57 Percent Think Great Replacement Theory Real,” Newsmax, December 20, 2023, <https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/great-replacement-theory-immigration-ramaswamy/2023/12/20/id/1146676/>.

[Asked of everyone.]

5) When you think about immigrants to the United States, which of the following statements do you GENERALLY agree with? Choose all that apply.

	<u>All</u>	<u>Biden supporters</u>	<u>Trump supporters</u>
Immigrants take jobs from American workers	22	12	33
Immigrants weaken the American economy, reducing our wealth	18	10	27
Immigrants reject core American values	17	7	29
<i>[Percentage choosing all three of the above]</i>	8	2	14
Our political leaders in Washington, D.C., have intentionally failed to reduce undocumented immigration because they want more immigrants to enter the country	36	9	67
I do not generally agree with any of the statements above	50	77	20

Note: Order of first three statements randomized during survey. Percentages sum to more than 100 because respondents were able to choose more than one statement.

Testing for the Fourth Populist Attitude: Leaders Overstepping the Law (Questions 6b and 7)

The fourth populist attitude the survey tested appears in a person’s willingness, because of the threats they sense, to allow a populist leader to override institutional checks on state power to achieve the movement’s goals. The survey therefore tested Trump and Biden

supporters' inclination to let their candidate break the law in response to perceived provocations from their political opposition.

Two questions appeared under a preamble noting that, "Some people have expressed concern that federal government law enforcement agencies like the Department of Justice and the IRS have been used by" leaders of the party—Democratic or Republican—opposed to the respondent's preferred political party "to target" the respondent's party's "leaders and supporters, while protecting their own."¹⁴ Trump and Biden supporters were then asked, as a prelude to a question about their preferred presidential candidate, if they agreed that members of their preferred party "harmed themselves if they comply with the law" when their political opponents "do not."

In general, people were evenly split on this question: 33% either agreed or strongly agreed; 30% disagreed or strongly disagreed; and 36% neither agreed nor disagreed (see table on next page). A slight 39% plurality of Trump supporters, however, agreed or strongly agreed, while just 22% disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 39% neither agreed nor disagreed. In contrast, a 38% plurality of Biden voters disagreed or strongly disagreed, while just 28% agreed or strongly agreed, and the remaining 34% were neutral.

The next question, appearing under the same preamble, asked specifically about the respondent's preferred candidate. It bluntly inquired whether the respondent "would trust" their preferred candidate, Biden or Trump, "as president to decide when to follow the law and when to ignore it to achieve justice."

Despite this direct language, the respondents were now more likely to agree. A 45% plurality of Biden and Trump supporters either agreed or strongly agreed; 21% disagreed or strongly disagreed; and 34% neither agreed nor disagreed.

There were partisan differences: Biden supporters were slightly more likely than Trump supporters to approve the idea. Among Biden supporters, 47% agreed or strongly agreed they would trust Biden to make that decision; 22% disagreed or strongly disagreed; and 31% remained neutral. Among Trump supporters, 43% agreed or strongly agreed; 20% disagreed or strongly disagreed; and 37% remained neutral.

The response to this last question was somewhat surprising. A key liberal democratic norm is the idea that "no one is above the law." Yet pluralities of Trump and Biden supporters trusted their candidate "to decide when to follow the law and when to ignore it." Granted, the stated goal was "to achieve justice," and it may be that some respondents read the question as asking whether they trusted their candidate to be thoughtful and judicious. But an executive's breaking the law is typically seen as unjust in itself.

¹⁴ About 9% of Biden and Trump supporters did not consider themselves Republicans or Democrats and did not lean toward either party. These respondents were assigned a party at random.

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

- 6) In recent years, some people have expressed concern that federal government law enforcement agencies like the Department of Justice and the IRS have been used by [opponents of preferred party: Democratic Party/Republican Party] leaders in Washington, D.C., to target [preferred party: Republican Party/Democratic Party] leaders and supporters, while protecting their own. When you think about politics and the law, would you agree or disagree with the following?

	<u>Strongly agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neither agree nor disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly disagree</u>
a) [Preferred party: Democrats/Republicans] harm themselves if they comply with the law when [opponents of preferred party: Republicans/Democrats] do not	9	24	36	21	9
<i>Biden supporters</i>	6	22	34	26	12
<i>Trump supporters</i>	13	26	39	17	6
b) I would trust [preferred candidate: Joe Biden/Donald Trump] as president to decide when to follow the law and when to ignore it to achieve justice	16	30	34	15	6
<i>Biden supporters</i>	15	32	31	15	7
<i>Trump supporters</i>	16	27	37	15	5

Note: Respondent's answer to question 1 determined their preferred candidate. Their preferred party was based on their response to questions about party preference in the America's Political Pulse survey. Those who were not self-reported Democrats or Republicans and leaned toward neither party were assigned one of the two parties at random.

Alternatively, some may have seen it as asking whether they trusted their own candidate more than his opponent when making decisions like this. But the question mentions only their own candidate, not the opposing candidate, whether Biden or Trump. In fact, the respondent hadn't seen the opposing candidate's name since the second question of the survey. The more likely explanation is that the preamble's implication that the federal government had become politically weaponized against their own party, followed by a reference to achieving "justice," allowed respondents to set aside concerns they may have had about their candidate's abusing presidential power.

We also posed a final question that paralleled one asked by the America's Political Pulse survey in its standard, core questionnaire, which our respondents also answered. In that questionnaire, our respondents answered this question:

Do you agree or disagree: If a [*respondent's party's: Democratic/Republican*] president can't get cooperation from [*the opposing party's: Democratic/Republican*] members of Congress to pass new laws, the [*their party's: Democratic/Republican*] president should circumvent Congress and issue executive orders on their own to accomplish their priorities.

In our portion of the survey, we asked Biden and Trump voters the same question, but replaced the generic Democratic or Republican president—whichever party the respondent favored¹⁵—with Joe Biden or Donald Trump, whichever *candidate* the respondent favored. In most cases, this meant replacing the earlier question's reference to "a Democratic president" with "Joe Biden" and "a Republican president" with "Donald Trump."

Note that a president ordinarily issues executive orders to create procedural regularity in the executive branch. Here, the question asks whether those orders should be misused to impose broader laws without congressional approval, short-circuiting the democratic process.

In general, we found that when specific names were inserted in place of a generic Democratic or Republican president, the respondents were somewhat more willing to agree with the idea of using executive orders to bypass a Congress stalled by their candidate's political opponents (see table on next page). With a generic party president, just 35% of Trump and Biden supporters agreed or strongly agreed with the idea, while 32% disagreed or strongly disagreed. When the presidential candidate's names were introduced, 41% of Trump and Biden supporters agreed or strongly agreed, while 28% disagreed or strongly disagreed.

In both questions, Biden supporters were more likely than Trump supporters to approve of using executive orders to bypass a deadlocked Congress, with 40% agreeing or strongly agreeing in the generic question and 42% agreeing or strongly agreeing when Biden was mentioned specifically. Regardless, the overall increase in approval of misusing executive orders when a candidate's name is added to the question comes primarily from Trump supporters: 29% approve of the idea when it involves a generic Republican president, while 39% approve when the president is Trump.¹⁶

¹⁵ As in an earlier question, Biden and Trump supporters who did not consider themselves Republicans or Democrats and did not lean toward either party were assigned a party at random. (See previous footnote.)

¹⁶ It is possible that Biden supporters' higher rate of approval of the use of executive orders to circumvent an opposition-stalled Congress is influenced somewhat by Biden's currently holding office and confronting a

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

7) Do you agree or disagree with the following?

		<u>Strongly agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	Neither agree nor <u>disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly disagree</u>
GENERIC (APP SURVEY)	If a [preferred party: Democratic/Republican] president can't get cooperation from [opponents of preferred candidate's party: Democratic/Republican] members of congress to pass new laws, the [preferred party: Democratic/Republican] president should circumvent Congress and issue executive orders on their own to accomplish their priorities.	9	25	33	20	12
	<i>Biden Supporters</i>	11	30	32	19	9
	<i>Trump Supporters</i>	8	21	34	22	15
BIDEN/TRUMP (ISMA SURVEY)	If [preferred candidate: Joe Biden/Donald Trump] is elected president and can't get cooperation from [opponents of preferred candidate's party: Democratic/Republican] members of Congress to pass new laws, President [preferred candidate: Biden/Trump] should circumvent Congress and issue executive orders on his own to accomplish his priorities.	13	28	31	20	8
	<i>Biden Supporters</i>	13	29	32	18	8
	<i>Trump Supporters</i>	12	26	31	23	8

Note: Respondent's answer to question 1 determined their preferred candidate in the ISMA survey (the second question in this table). The first question in this table—the generic-president version from the America's Political Pulse survey—was asked of all respondents, but for purposes of comparison, the results shown above include only those from the ISMA survey's Biden and Trump supporters.

Republican House. Biden supporters face a current and ever-present temptation to approve of this gambit, not oppose it. Republicans, on the other hand, face a current and ever-present incentive to disapprove of it, perhaps leading more Trump supporters to oppose the idea in the questions discussed here. This is entirely speculative, however. The America's Political Pulse survey was first fielded during the Biden administration, so there is no historical evidence about how a change in the party of the president might affect the levels of partisan approval here.

The fourth populist attitude involved a person's willingness to support their preferred leader's overstepping limits on state power to achieve populist movement's goals. Respondents were held to exhibit this attitude if they agreed or strongly agreed that they trusted their candidate to decide when to follow and when to ignore the law to achieve justice, or if they agreed or strongly agreed to the use of executive orders to circumvent a Congress stalled by the president's political opponents when their preferred candidate was the president after showing less agreement with the idea in the parallel question about a generic Democratic or Republican president. By this measure, 52% of Biden and Trump supporters appear to exhibit this attitude, including 53% of Biden supporters and 51% of Trump supporters.

Note that these numbers were generated by our providing two different ways for people to qualify as exhibiting that attitude. But we did this for the other two attitudes, as well; both involved two avenues by which respondents could qualify. The high percentages in this case were driven largely by the percentage who agreed or strongly agreed that they trusted their candidate to decide when, as president, to ignore the law.

Initial Findings on Populism

Using the questions above and a scheme written before we received the data, we isolated the respondents who appeared to exhibit all three of the populist attitudes we tested for: a strong connection with the candidate or his agenda; cynicism toward elites; and a willingness to let their preferred leader work outside the law to achieve his goals. In the first two cases, we looked for respondents who strongly agreed with statements expressing these attitudes, since the attitudes are thought to be strong in populist movements; in the third case, however, we included respondents who simply agreed, as well as strongly agreed, since either level of agreement would provide support for their political leader's violations of the law or constitutional process. The exact responses that were interpreted as evidence of each of the three attitudes were detailed in the sections above, but they are summarized in a single place in the appendix (see "Assigning Populist Attitudes Using the Survey Questions," page 24).

The table on the next page shows the percentages of Biden and Trump supporters who appeared to exhibit each of the three populist attitudes tested. The bottom row shows the percentage of people who exhibited evidence of all three—much smaller percentages across the board. This drop is not a major surprise. As long as the three attitudes represent somewhat different things (rather than different aspects of the same basic attitude), the odds that someone will hold all three can decrease rapidly.

In light of the much smaller numbers in the bottom row, it's worth returning to a point made earlier—i.e., that exhibiting a single possible populist attitude does not make one a "populist." Indeed, statistical tests of the data show that holding one of these attitudes was, at the very most, weakly correlated with holding another. This was true among Biden and Trump supporters as a group, among Biden supporters alone, and among Trump supporters alone. The absolute value of the pairwise correlation coefficients was in every case less than 0.2, and some of the coefficients were negative, suggesting, if anything, an

inverse relationship, in which holding one attitude was associated with being less likely to hold the other.¹⁷

Evidence of Populist Attitudes Among Biden and Trump Supporters

	Percentage of All Biden and Trump Supporters	Percentage of Biden Supporters	Percentage of Trump Supporters
Attitude 1: Close Connection with Political Leader	13.9	6.9	21.1
Attitude 2: Cynicism about Governing Elites	45.3*	36.1	54.8
Attitude 4: Support for Leader’s Breaching Limits on State Power	51.9	52.6	51.2
All Three Attitudes	5.3	2.5	10.3

* *This figure represents the percentage among Biden and Trump supporters. All respondents answered the questions about governing elites, however, including those who didn’t say they would vote for Biden or Trump. Among all respondents, the figure was 43.0%.*

As for the numbers themselves, we’ll adopt here, for simplicity’s sake, the convention that those who display all three attitudes are “populists,” even though our definition actually includes the four attitudes listed on page 2. Under this labeling, the table above shows that the “populists” supporting Donald Trump represent about four times as large a percentage of Trump’s base of supporters (10.3%) as the populists supporting Biden represent of Biden’s base (2.5%). Since the number of Biden supporters is slightly larger than the number of Trump supporters, the weighted number of Trump populists is slightly less than four times the weighted number of Biden populists—a factor of 3.89, or 3.85% vs. 0.99% of U.S. adults.

These numbers cannot be presumed to be precise, but the larger number of Trump populists than Biden populists seems directionally correct. The emergence of Trump as a power in Republican politics is the primary reason that concerns about “populism” exploded on the American scene in the past eight years. Biden, in contrast, was favored as a Democratic Party presidential nominee precisely because he was seen as a unifying consensus candidate, not a polarizer.

¹⁷ Results of the correlation calculations appear in the appendix (see page 26). It was interesting that the correlation coefficients between the second and fourth attitudes—whether between all Trump and Biden supporters or each group alone—were consistently negative (though their absolute value was less than 0.1). Perhaps Americans’ distrust of government elites leads, at least in some cases, to a beneficial desire to *maintain*—not reduce—barriers to presidential overreach.

In terms of statistical confidence, a Welch's two-sample t-test indicates that the direction of difference between the percentage of Trump populists and the percentage of Biden populists in our results is correct at a 95% confidence level. In other words, there's 95% confidence that populists by our definition do indeed make up more of Trump's base of supporters than they do of Biden's, and that our results weren't a chance outcome of our particular survey sample. In fact, a simulated sampling—or "bootstrapping"—technique indicates we can have 95% confidence that in the U.S. population, the percentage Trump supporters who are populists is between 2.1 and 9.3 times the percentage of Biden supporters who are populists.¹⁸

The groups of Trump populists and Biden populists found here seem directionally correct in another way as well: A two-sample t-test indicates that both groups have significantly higher levels of affective political polarization, as measured by the Polarization Research Lab in the America's Political Pulse survey, than nonpopulists do. In calculating affective polarization scores for its survey respondents, the lab asks the respondent to rate how they feel about their own political party on a scale from 0 to 100 and how they feel about the opposing party on a scale from 0 to 100. Their affective polarization is the difference between the two ratings, and by definition, it ranges as high as 100.¹⁹ Democrats have exhibited, on average, a slightly higher level of affective polarization than Republicans, but the difference between the two parties is slim.²⁰ At the time of our survey, Republicans had a slightly higher average affective polarization (53.1) than Democrats (51.5).

In contrast, the populists who exhibited all three populist attitudes among Biden supporters, Trump supporters, and both Trump and Biden supporters pooled together had average affective polarizations of 81.0, 76.1 and 77.1, respectively. These figures were considerably higher than the average affective polarizations of the nonpopulists (that is, those who didn't exhibit all three populist attitudes) in each of the three groups—54.6, 52.8 and 53.8, respectively. Statistical tests indicate with 95% confidence that in each of these three groups, the populists' higher affective polarization was not a sampling fluke. Indeed, further calculations show that we can say with 95% confidence that the populists among Biden and Trump supporters as a whole have a mean affective polarization that is between 13.9 to 31.6 points higher than "nonpopulists" among those same supporters.²¹ This finding of a high and significant difference in affective polarization occurs against a backdrop in which

¹⁸ In our survey, as noted earlier, the percentage of populists in Trump's base (10.3%) was about four times the percentage of populists in Biden's base (2.5%)—or about 4.05 times, more precisely. A bootstrapping approach can also be used to generate a 95% confidence interval for the simple ratio of Trump populists to Biden populists (which, as also noted earlier, was about 3.88 in our survey). That 95% confidence interval is between 2.0 and 9.0, a range similar to the 95% confidence interval of 2.1 to 9.3 in the slightly different calculation in the main text involving the ratio of the *percentages* of the two candidates' support who are populists.

¹⁹ See "Affective Polarization in the US," Polarization Research Lab, accessed January 31, 2024, <https://polarizationresearchlab.org/americas-political-pulse/>. See also Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes, "Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (January 1, 2012): 405–31, <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs038>. Note that the lab excludes differences that are less than 0.

²⁰ Matthew T. Wetzel (data scientist, Polarization Research Lab), email message to author, February 9, 2024.

²¹ The same calculation yields 95% confidence that Trump populists have an affective polarization 13.2 to 34.2 points higher than other Trump supporters (Trump nonpopulists), and that Biden populists have an affective polarization 6.6 and 40.5 points higher than other Biden supporters (Biden nonpopulists).

Americans' affective political polarization typically does not vary much by gender, education, race or income, and where, as noted above, average Republican and Democratic affective polarization is nearly identical.²²

This suggests that Trump and Biden populists show the stronger political passions often associated with populist movements. It also suggests something that we will investigate in future research: the possibility that for Trump and Biden populists, the “social other” discussed as the third attitude above is simply the opposing party—or perhaps more broadly, the political left and the political right, respectively. This view would be consistent, at least among Trump populists, with Donald Trump's observation, “Our most dangerous people are people from within” the country.²³

A look at the Trump populists produces other intriguing results. Again, these findings for such a small group can't be considered precise, but the response of the Trump populists on the survey's questions on immigrants and immigration again seems suggestive (see table on next page). As noted earlier, skepticism about immigrants is generally lower among Biden supporters and higher among Trump supporters, but the disparity was considerably higher with Trump populists. The percentage of these Trump populists who felt immigrants weakened the American economy, took jobs from American workers and rejected core American values hovered around 50%, not 20% or 30%, and virtually of them—94%—agreed with the view that U.S. political leaders essentially welcome undocumented immigration. Very few held none of these negative views.

Of course, most of the Trump populists said they supported Trump's policy agenda, so their views on immigration are not a complete shock. Still, the Trump populists were not chosen for their views on specific issues, and the apparent magnitude of the difference here suggests they are indeed distinct from other Trump supporters while remaining characteristic of those supporters.

This same distinctiveness appears elsewhere in Trump populists' responses to questions in the America's Political Pulse survey. Among the majority of Trump populists who considered themselves Republican or who lean Republican, 99% said they were MAGA Republicans. On contested cultural topics like abortion, guns, defunding the police, and transgender athletes, they held conservative views even compared to other Trump supporters (though this finding is qualified somewhat by the fact that not all Trump populists were asked these questions). And while Trump supporters are generally more religious than Biden supporters, with 53% saying religion is very important in their lives and 46% saying they are “born again,” 66% and 53% of Trump populists say the same.

Trump populists' responses were suggestive in one other area as well—an America's Political Pulse question measuring the respondent's level of general trust. The question asked, “Do you think your wallet (or your valuables) would be returned to you if it were found by a stranger?” About 34% of Americans said yes. This rose to 40% among Biden

²² See Thomas Shull, “Key Liberal Norms Are Holding Despite America's Polarization,” *The UnPopulist*, June 8, 2023, <https://www.theunpopulist.net/p/key-liberal-norms-are-holding-despite>.

²³ Susan Milligan, “Trump: ‘Our Most Dangerous People Are People From Within,’” U.S. News, accessed February 1, 2024, <http://tinyurl.com/v2hxcabt>.

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supporters but fell to 29% among Trump supporters and dropped to just 16.5% among Trump populists—a percentage lower than that registered among any large subgroup by gender, age, race, income or political party.²⁴

[Asked of everyone.]

7) When you think about immigrants to the United States, which of the following statements do you GENERALLY agree with? Choose all that apply.

	<u>All</u>	<u>Biden supporters</u>	<u>Trump supporters</u>	<u>Trump Populists</u>
Immigrants take jobs from American workers	22	12	33	52
Immigrants weaken the American economy, reducing our wealth	18	10	27	46
Immigrants reject core American values	17	7	29	50
<i>[Percentage choosing all three of the above]</i>	8	2	14	31
Our political leaders in Washington, D.C., have intentionally failed to reduce undocumented immigration because they want more immigrants to enter the country	36	9	67	94
I do not generally agree with any of the statements above	50	77	20	5

Note: Order of first three statements randomized during survey. Percentages sum to more than 100 because respondents were able to choose more than one statement.

²⁴ Native Americans and Middle Easterners, representing 1.0% and 0.2% of the respondents, respectively, did register even lower levels of general trust: 11.9% and 0%, respectively, said their valuables would be returned.

This figure provides a stark contrast with the Biden populists, 47.8% of whom said they thought they would get their valuables back—nearly three times the percentage of Trump populists. Again, because there are very few Biden populists, this figure is not particularly reliable, but Biden populists exhibit several differences from Trump populists that suggest that however much the two groups may share populist attitudes and high affective polarization, they are distinct.

On immigration, for instance, only small minorities of Biden populists—comparable with the minorities of Biden supporters as a whole—agreed with any of the three negative statements on immigrants. None of them chose all three, and none of them endorsed the idea that American political leaders were intentionally failing to reduce undocumented immigration; the same figures were 31% and 94% of Trump populists, respectively. Indeed, 72% of Biden populists chose none of the negative statements about immigrants and immigration, compared to just 5% of Trump populists.

Very few Biden populists were asked their views on abortion, guns, defunding the police and transgender athletes, but the very limited evidence suggests they were generally more “liberal” or “progressive” in their views than Trump populists. A clearer distinction came when they were asked how proud they were to be an American and whether they agreed or disagreed that “you can expect fair treatment from government authorities.” While 74% of Trump populists said they were “extremely proud” to be an American, just 45% of Biden populists said the same. And while just 12% of Trump populists agreed or strongly agreed that one could expect fair treatment from government authorities, 53% of Biden populists did so.

The Influence of Populism

As noted above, the group of Trump populists is relatively small, representing just 10% of Trump’s total support. If Donald Trump’s movement is indeed populist, as it’s widely considered to be, is the number of populists we’ve detected too low?

This is certainly possible. We consider this first ISMA survey to be exploratory. It may be that our efforts—based in part on secondary research sources—to summarize general patterns from the diverse and specialized academic research on populism have not fully captured the original scholarly insights. In addition, it is likely enough that our efforts to operationalize those general scholarly findings in this initial, exploratory survey need refinement.

But it also seems likely that the populists we’ve defined do not represent the full populist effect present in American politics. As we noted at the outset of this report, while a populist movement might derive energy and direction from people who hold all three populist attitudes, it seems likely enough that a populist movement, like all political movements, would gain strength and size from a coalition of people who share some, though not necessarily all, of the populist attitudes in common.

For example, some Trump supporters exhibited the second and fourth of our populist attitudes, while others exhibited the first and the fourth. In other words, while some Trump

supporters did not demonstrate a particularly strong attachment to Trump personally or his agenda, they did evince a strongly skeptical view of America's governing elites and show a willingness to let him to step outside the law to achieve his aims. Other Trump supporters were willing to let him step outside the law and exhibited a strong attachment to him and his agenda, even though they did not feel as passionately about the perceived failings of America's governing elites. Members of these two additional groups would certainly add to the political support for Trump's exceeding the legal boundaries placed on executive power, and together with the "pure" populists, they would represent about 32% of Trump supporters. A similar coalition among Biden backers would represent about 20% of Biden's support. Indeed, including more broadly all those who exhibited two of the three populist attitudes, the populist coalition would rise to 37% of Trump's support, though it would still remain at about 20% of Biden's support.

We therefore plan to continue analyzing these additional "partly populist" groups to see whether they show other signs of similarity to the pure populists we identified here. We will carry any insights that result from this analysis to future surveys. In those surveys, we'll also test the possibility, mentioned above, that the populists identified here are indeed exhibiting the additional populist attitude toward "social others" in their unusually high levels of political polarization. It may be that they view "the other side"—whether the Democratic or Republican parties, or the political left or the political right—as not being "real" or "true" Americans far more than they might an immigrant eager to live in the United States.

Other areas of interest in subsequent surveys will be determining what may be motivating the widespread skepticism of government elites, particularly among Biden supporters, who have not, like Trump supporters, been vocal about the "administrative state" or "the deep state." We similarly want to explore further the reasons for Americans' apparent willingness to tolerate abuses of executive power—is it a sense of emergency, or is it perhaps a failure to understand the potential risks?—as well as the extent to which Trump and Biden backers would support their candidate's weakening political parties, the media and other mediating institutions in the American political process. And as mentioned earlier, we would also explore Americans' attitudes toward nongovernmental elites, such as business, religious and cultural elites.

Of course, populist voters are only part of a populist equation. The presence and nature of populist leaders also matters to the success of a populist movement in achieving its aims. But even when a movement fails to reach its goals, its underlying concerns remain. Constructively addressing these concerns requires understanding a populist movement's composition, views and values—insights that ISMA hopes to promote with its survey research initiative, of which this survey is a modest first step.

Appendix

Assigning Populist Attitudes Using the Survey Questions

The populist attitudes on which this survey was based are listed above on page 2. Those were that members of populist movements:

1. feel an unusually direct connection with a populist leader or with his or her agenda, experiencing a sense that this leader understands them and will defend their interests;
2. see themselves, or people like themselves, as oppressed, harmed or ignored by powerful elites, often government elites, who act against their interests;
3. perceive themselves, or people like themselves, as losing wealth, status or influence to others favored or unchecked by the elites—perhaps immigrants or others who, unlike people like themselves, are not “real” or “true” members of the nation;
4. support the populist leader, because of his or her stance against the threats they sense, in overriding institutional checks on the state’s power to achieve the movements goals.

As we mentioned there:

In our 10-question survey, we tested for the first, second and fourth of these attitudes, largely omitting the third due to the difficulty of determining and testing, particularly in a short questionnaire, the broad range of “social others” whom the respondents might have identified. We plan to explore this attitude in a future survey, but we did include in this poll a question testing various attitudes toward immigrants, whose background and intentions Donald Trump has questioned in the past.

In the report’s main text, we explained which responses were interpreted as evidence of the presence of each of three attitudes we tested. Those decisions are summarized in one place in the table that starts on the next page. The three attitudes are listed as attitudes 1, 2 and 4. Note that our tentative exploration of attitude 3 in a “choose all that apply” question about immigrants and immigration appears in gray shading there; we tentatively assigned this attitude to those who selected all three of the negative statements about immigrants—i.e., immigrants purportedly weakening the economy, taking American jobs and rejecting American cultural values.

The 10 questions are numbered as they were above, starting with question 1 (Q1) and ending with question 7 (Q7), with questions 3, 4 and 6 having two parts, *a* and *b*. Question 5, concerning immigration, counted as a single question, though it had five elements; these are treated as parts *a* through *e* in the table below.

Brief phrases describing each question are provided after the question number to help identify the question’s content.

Populist Attitudes Survey Key

Attitude 1: Q2 *primary reason* = “I feel a personal connection with him” OR
 (Q2 *primary reason* = “I support his policy agenda” AND
 Q3a *candidate understands* = “Strongly Agree” AND
 Q3b *candidate fights* = “Strongly agree”)

Biden supporter with Attitude 1: Q1 <i>candidate choice</i> = “Democrat Joe Biden” AND displays Attitude 1 as defined above	Trump supporter with Attitude 1: Q1 <i>candidate choice</i> = “Republican Donald Trump” AND displays Attitude 1 as defined above
---	--

Attitude 2: Q4a *political elite* = “Strongly agree” OR
 Q4b *bureaucratic elite* = “Strongly agree”

Biden supporter with Attitude 2: Q1 <i>candidate choice</i> = “Democrat Joe Biden” AND displays Attitude 2 as defined above	Trump supporter with Attitude 2: Q1 <i>candidate choice</i> = “Republican Donald Trump” AND displays Attitude 2 as defined above
---	--

Attitude 4: (Q6b *candidate ignore law* = “Strongly agree” or “Agree”) OR
 [(Q7 *candidate circumvent Congress* = “Strongly agree” AND
 Generic Executive < “Strongly agree”)] OR
 [(Q7 *candidate circumvent Congress* = “Agree” AND Generic Executive <
 “Agree”)]*

Biden supporter with Attitude 4: Q1 <i>candidate choice</i> = “Democrat Joe Biden” AND displays Attitude 4 as defined above	Trump supporter with Attitude 4: Q1 <i>candidate choice</i> = “Republican Donald Trump” AND displays Attitude 4 as defined above
---	--

Attitude 3: (Q5a *immigrants weaken economy* = “selected”) AND
 (Q5b *immigrants take jobs* = “selected”) AND
 (Q5c *immigrants reject values* = “selected”) **

Biden supporter with Attitude 3: Q1 <i>candidate choice</i> = “Democrat Joe Biden” AND displays Attitude 3 as defined above	Trump supporter with Attitude 3: Q1 <i>candidate choice</i> = “Republican Donald Trump” AND displays Attitude 3 as defined above
---	--

* “Generic Executive” represents the America’s Political Pulse survey question that our Question 7 paralleled. The APP question asked, “If a [preferred party: Democratic/Republican] president can’t get cooperation from [opponents of preferred party: Republican/Democratic] members of Congress to pass new laws, the [their party’s: Democratic/Republican] president should circumvent Congress and issue executive orders on their own to accomplish their priorities.”

** This attitude was not included in the definitions or calculations of populists, Biden populists or Trump populists.

Correlation Computations: Relations Between the Populist Attitudes

The tables on the next two pages show the results in R of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient calculations between the four populist attitudes—described in those tables as “dynamics”—for the following:

- Biden and Trump supporters as a group, with the populist attitudes among them represented as D1, D2, D3 and D4
- Biden supporters alone, with the populist attitudes among them represented as BD1, BD2, BD3 and BD4
- Trump supporters alone, with the populist attitudes among them represented as TD1, TD2, TD3 and TD4

The number of each dynamic (or attitude) corresponds to the numbered list of the attitudes appearing on page 2 and again on page 24. BD1, for instance, would represent Biden supporters who exhibited a strong connection with Joe Biden or with his policy agenda. The third attitude, involving concern about people who are not “true” or “real” members of the nation, was tentatively tested with a question about immigrants and immigration (see the explanation under “Assigning Populist Attitudes Using the Survey Questions,” starting on page 24).

In the tables below, none of the pairwise correlation calculations yielded a result whose absolute value exceeded 0.2, indicating that the correlations were weak at best. In other words, the attitudes generally varied independently of one another, so that a respondent displaying one of the attitudes was not more likely to display another—or for that matter, less likely either.

Correlations between component dynamics

```
weighted_correlation <- function(x, y, data, wt, na.rm = TRUE) {  
  data <- data %>%  
    select({{x}}, {{y}}, {{wt}})  
  
  if (na.rm) {  
    data <- filter(data, if_all(everything(), ~ !is.na(.)))  
  }  
  
  cov.wt(data, wt = data[[deparse(substitute(wt))]], cor = TRUE)$cor[1, 2]  
}  
  
(cor_12 <- weighted_correlation(D1, D2, data, weight))  
  
## [1] 0.16333  
  
(cor_13 <- weighted_correlation(D1, D3, data, weight))  
  
## [1] 0.1430245  
  
(cor_14 <- weighted_correlation(D1, D4, data, weight))  
  
## [1] 0.1507783  
  
(cor_23 <- weighted_correlation(D2, D3, data, weight))  
  
## [1] 0.1170251  
  
(cor_24 <- weighted_correlation(D2, D4, data, weight))  
  
## [1] -0.05618524  
  
(cor_34 <- weighted_correlation(D3, D4, data, weight))  
  
## [1] 0.0651331  
  
(cor_biden_12 <- weighted_correlation(BD1, BD2, data, weight))  
  
## [1] 0.07942336  
  
(cor_biden_13 <- weighted_correlation(BD1, BD3, data, weight))  
  
## [1] 0.05967545
```

Appendix

```
(cor_biden_14 <- weighted_correlation(BD1, BD4, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] 0.1167785
```

```
(cor_biden_23 <- weighted_correlation(BD2, BD3, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] -0.0877015
```

```
(cor_biden_24 <- weighted_correlation(BD2, BD4, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] -0.08417147
```

```
(cor_biden_34 <- weighted_correlation(BD3, BD4, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] 0.02626531
```

```
(cor_trump_12 <- weighted_correlation(TD1, TD2, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] 0.1659047
```

```
(cor_trump_13 <- weighted_correlation(TD1, TD3, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] 0.1136856
```

```
(cor_trump_14 <- weighted_correlation(TD1, TD4, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] 0.1898386
```

```
(cor_trump_23 <- weighted_correlation(TD2, TD3, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] 0.1658317
```

```
(cor_trump_24 <- weighted_correlation(TD2, TD4, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] -0.02501632
```

```
(cor_trump_34 <- weighted_correlation(TD3, TD4, data, weight))
```

```
## [1] 0.09708439
```

Appendix

Standard Crosstabulations

[Asked of everyone.]

- 1) If the upcoming presidential election were held tomorrow and the Republican and Democratic candidates were Donald Trump and Joe Biden, whom would you probably vote for?

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

	All	Age					Gender	
		18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Democrat Joe Biden	39	41	36	38	39	42	39	39
Republican Donald Trump	37	27	34	42	44	43	36	39
I would vote for someone else	12	13	18	11	9	7	13	11
I'm not sure	6	9	7	3	4	5	7	5
I don't think I would vote	6	10	5	5	4	3	5	6
N	1000	210	252	150	176	212	513	487

	All	Race				Education		Marital Status	
		White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
Democrat Joe Biden	39	33	61	40	46	36	46	43	34
Republican Donald Trump	37	46	10	29	32	39	34	31	46
I would vote for someone else	12	11	14	15	9	12	12	12	12
I'm not sure	6	5	12	6	5	7	5	8	4
I don't think I would vote	6	4	4	10	7	6	3	6	4
N	1000	628	121	164	87	697	303	540	460

	All	Family Income			Party ID		
		Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Democrat Joe Biden	39	40	37	48	79	4	30
Republican Donald Trump	37	35	41	35	3	83	35
I would vote for someone else	12	12	14	10	9	7	18
I'm not sure	6	6	6	3	5	3	10
I don't think I would vote	6	7	2	4	4	2	7
N	1000	416	293	191	370	297	260

	All	Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
		Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Democrat Joe Biden	39	73	46	6	100	0	0
Republican Donald Trump	37	7	27	78	0	100	0
I would vote for someone else	12	13	14	8	0	0	51
I'm not sure	6	3	7	5	0	0	25
I don't think I would vote	6	4	6	3	0	0	24
N	1000	291	327	326	390	375	235

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

2) Which of the following would you say is the PRIMARY reason you would vote for [preferred candidate: Joe Biden/Donald Trump]? Choose only one.

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

	All	Age					Gender		
		18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male	
I support his policy agenda	39	34	28	37	44	53	39	40	
I don't want [Donald Trump/Joe Biden] to be elected president	34	25	35	41	37	34	35	33	
I am a [Democrat/Republican] and prefer to vote for my party's candidate	19	30	26	15	15	10	19	20	
I feel a personal connection with him	3	6	5	2	2	1	3	4	
None of the above really describes why I would vote for [Joe Biden/Donald Trump]	4	6	5	4	2	2	4	3	
N	765	143	177	121	145	179	382	383	
	All	Race				Education		Marital Status	
		White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
I support his policy agenda	39	45	27	28	34	38	43	35	44
I don't want [Donald Trump/Joe Biden] to be elected president	34	36	24	36	31	34	36	39	29
I am a [Democrat/Republican] and prefer to vote for my party's candidate	19	14	39	27	22	21	15	16	22
I feel a personal connection with him	3	2	5	6	4	4	2	4	3
None of the above really describes why I would vote for [Joe Biden/Donald Trump]	4	3	5	4	9	4	4	5	2
N	765	498	86	113	68	523	242	399	366
	All	Family Income			Party ID				
		Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent		
I support his policy agenda	39	34	44	41	28	50	41		
I don't want [Donald Trump/Joe Biden] to be elected president	34	36	32	35	38	24	46		
I am a [Democrat/Republican] and prefer to vote for my party's candidate	19	21	20	16	31	18	5		
I feel a personal connection with him	3	4	2	5	3	6	1		
None of the above really describes why I would vote for [Joe Biden/Donald Trump]	4	5	3	3	1	2	8		
N	765	313	227	158	303	261	168		

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Appendix

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[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

2) Which of the following would you say is the PRIMARY reason you would vote for [preferred candidate: Joe Biden/Donald Trump]? Choose only one.

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

	All	Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
		Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
I support his policy agenda	39	27	33	56	25	54	NA
I don't want [Donald Trump/Joe Biden] to be elected president	34	50	35	22	46	23	NA
I am a [Democrat/Republican] and prefer to vote for my party's candidate	19	20	24	15	24	14	NA
I feel a personal connection with him	3	2	2	6	2	5	NA
None of the above really describes why I would vote for [Joe Biden/Donald Trump]	4	2	7	2	3	5	NA
N	765	233	240	273	390	375	NA

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

3) When you think about [*preferred candidate*: Donald Trump/Joe Biden], do you agree or disagree with the following?

a) He's the only recent candidate who understands people like me

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

		Age					Gender	
	All	18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Strongly agree	21	15	15	20	27	27	20	22
Agree	36	47	33	33	27	39	34	38
Neither agree nor disagree	25	18	27	30	26	24	28	22
Disagree	13	12	15	15	14	9	14	12
Strongly disagree	5	8	10	2	5	1	5	6
N	765	143	177	121	145	179	382	383

		Race					Education		Marital Status	
	All	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married	
Strongly agree	21	20	15	26	24	22	19	19	23	
Agree	36	35	45	35	29	37	33	37	35	
Neither agree nor disagree	25	24	27	25	29	26	23	25	25	
Disagree	13	15	8	8	13	11	18	12	14	
Strongly disagree	5	5	4	6	5	4	7	7	3	
N	765	498	86	113	68	523	242	399	366	

		Family Income			Party ID		
	All	Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Strongly agree	21	25	19	18	19	27	14
Agree	36	36	35	37	40	39	28
Neither agree nor disagree	25	24	24	24	24	17	37
Disagree	13	10	17	14	11	14	16
Strongly disagree	5	6	5	7	7	3	6
N	765	313	227	158	303	261	168

		Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Strongly agree	21	16	15	31	16	26	NA
Agree	36	33	38	37	35	37	NA
Neither agree nor disagree	25	28	30	17	28	22	NA
Disagree	13	13	12	13	13	13	NA
Strongly disagree	5	10	5	2	8	3	NA
N	765	233	240	273	390	375	NA

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

3) When you think about [*preferred candidate*: Donald Trump/Joe Biden], do you agree or disagree with the following?

b) He's the only recent candidate who will actually fight for people like me

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

	All	Age					Gender	
		18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Strongly agree	31	25	24	34	33	39	29	32
Agree	36	34	35	34	41	37	37	36
Neither agree nor disagree	19	24	21	20	15	16	21	17
Disagree	10	13	11	13	9	6	9	11
Strongly disagree	4	5	9	0	2	1	3	4
N	765	143	177	121	145	179	382	383

	All	Race				Education		Marital Status	
		White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
Strongly agree	31	33	25	31	26	30	32	28	34
Agree	36	37	44	32	29	37	34	36	37
Neither agree nor disagree	19	16	20	27	29	21	15	20	18
Disagree	10	11	9	6	13	8	14	11	9
Strongly disagree	4	4	3	4	3	3	4	5	3
N	765	498	86	113	68	523	242	399	366

	All	Family Income			Party ID		
		Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Strongly agree	31	34	27	30	26	40	23
Agree	36	36	37	38	39	37	33
Neither agree nor disagree	19	18	21	17	22	10	27
Disagree	10	9	11	11	8	11	13
Strongly disagree	4	4	3	5	5	2	4
N	765	313	227	158	303	261	168

	All	Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
		Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Strongly agree	31	23	21	47	21	41	NA
Agree	36	37	38	34	37	36	NA
Neither agree nor disagree	19	22	28	8	25	12	NA
Disagree	10	11	9	10	11	8	NA
Strongly disagree	4	7	3	2	5	2	NA
N	765	233	240	273	390	375	NA

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of everyone.]

4) Some people have expressed concern recently that the elites who run America’s most powerful institutions are losing touch with the rest of society and starting to serve their own selfish interests more than they are the public. When you think of America’s elites, do you agree or disagree with the following?

a) America’s political elites among its national elected officials have often harmed the interests of Americans like me in pursuit of their own selfish interests

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with “N” show the number of respondents*

		Age					Gender	
	All	18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Strongly agree	39	30	31	45	47	45	37	40
Agree	35	35	37	37	29	37	36	34
Neither agree nor disagree	22	30	25	15	21	16	24	20
Disagree	3	3	5	2	3	2	2	4
Strongly disagree	1	2	2	1	0	1	1	1
N	999	210	252	150	174	212	512	487

		Race					Education		Marital Status	
	All	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married	
Strongly agree	39	43	22	29	47	40	36	38	40	
Agree	35	36	42	33	25	32	42	33	38	
Neither agree nor disagree	22	17	30	32	24	23	20	24	19	
Disagree	3	3	3	5	4	3	3	4	2	
Strongly disagree	1	1	3	1	1	2	0	2	1	
N	999	627	121	164	87	696	303	540	459	

		Family Income			Party ID		
	All	Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Strongly agree	39	39	38	38	28	44	46
Agree	35	30	37	45	42	36	28
Neither agree nor disagree	22	26	21	13	25	15	23
Disagree	3	3	3	3	5	4	1
Strongly disagree	1	2	1	0	1	0	2
N	999	416	291	191	370	296	260

		Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Strongly agree	39	39	30	49	30	51	33
Agree	35	39	34	36	43	31	29
Neither agree nor disagree	22	17	31	12	22	14	34
Disagree	3	3	4	3	4	3	2
Strongly disagree	1	2	2	1	1	1	2
N	999	291	327	325	390	374	235

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

4) Some people have expressed concern recently that the elites who run America’s most powerful institutions are losing touch with the rest of society and starting to serve their own selfish interests more than they are the public. When you think of America’s elites, do you agree or disagree with the following?

b) America’s bureaucratic elites among the unelected officials in the federal government have often harmed the interests of Americans like me in pursuit of their own selfish interests

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with “N” show the number of respondents*

		Age					Gender	
	All	18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Strongly agree	36	21	31	42	47	44	36	36
Agree	33	35	32	31	30	35	31	35
Neither agree nor disagree	25	36	29	21	20	14	29	20
Disagree	5	5	6	4	3	5	4	6
Strongly disagree	2	3	2	2	0	2	1	3
N	1000	210	252	150	176	212	513	487

		Race				Education		Marital Status	
	All	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
Strongly agree	36	41	25	25	39	37	33	35	37
Agree	33	34	32	29	28	32	34	32	34
Neither agree nor disagree	25	19	32	41	24	25	24	25	23
Disagree	5	4	9	4	5	4	8	5	4
Strongly disagree	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	1
N	1000	628	121	164	87	697	303	540	460

		Family Income			Party ID		
	All	Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Strongly agree	36	35	36	38	26	43	41
Agree	33	31	33	36	36	34	30
Neither agree nor disagree	25	27	26	17	27	20	23
Disagree	5	5	3	8	7	3	4
Strongly disagree	2	2	2	1	3	1	2
N	1000	416	293	191	370	297	260

		Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Strongly agree	36	34	27	48	29	49	28
Agree	33	38	28	36	37	30	30
Neither agree nor disagree	25	18	36	14	23	19	36
Disagree	5	7	7	1	8	2	4
Strongly disagree	2	2	2	1	3	1	2
N	1000	291	327	326	390	375	235

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of everyone.]

5) When you think about immigrants to the United States, which of the following statements do you GENERALLY agree with? Choose all that apply.

Immigrants take jobs from American workers

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

		Age					Gender	
	All	18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Not selected	78	75	76	80	78	81	77	79
Selected	22	25	24	20	22	19	23	21
N	1000	210	252	150	176	212	513	487

		Race				Education		Marital Status	
	All	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
Not selected	78	76	76	86	79	76	83	77	79
Selected	22	24	24	14	21	24	17	23	21
N	1000	628	121	164	87	697	303	540	460

		Family Income			Party ID		
	All	Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Not selected	78	76	78	83	85	72	75
Selected	22	24	22	17	15	28	25
N	1000	416	293	191	370	297	260

		Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Not selected	78	91	78	67	88	67	78
Selected	22	9	22	33	12	33	22
N	1000	291	327	326	390	375	235

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of everyone.]

5) When you think about immigrants to the United States, which of the following statements do you **GENERALLY** agree with? Choose all that apply.

Immigrants weaken the American economy, reducing our wealth

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

		Age					Gender	
	All	18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Not selected	82	85	79	87	76	84	82	82
Selected	18	15	21	13	24	16	18	18
N	1000	210	252	150	176	212	513	487

		Race				Education		Marital Status	
	All	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
Not selected	82	81	82	84	87	82	83	83	80
Selected	18	19	18	16	13	18	17	17	20
N	1000	628	121	164	87	697	303	540	460

		Family Income			Party ID		
	All	Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Not selected	82	82	82	82	87	77	81
Selected	18	18	18	18	13	23	19
N	1000	416	293	191	370	297	260

		Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Not selected	82	91	84	72	90	73	84
Selected	18	9	16	28	10	27	16
N	1000	291	327	326	390	375	235

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of everyone.]

- 5) When you think about immigrants to the United States, which of the following statements do you GENERALLY agree with? Choose all that apply.

Immigrants reject core American values

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

		Age					Gender	
	All	<u>18-29</u>	<u>30-44</u>	<u>45-54</u>	<u>55-64</u>	<u>65+</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>
Not selected	83	85	83	88	81	81	85	81
Selected	17	15	17	12	19	19	15	19
N	1000	210	252	150	176	212	513	487

		Race				Education		Marital Status	
	All	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Hispanic</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Less Than College</u>	<u>College</u>	<u>Not Married</u>	<u>Married</u>
Not selected	83	82	87	88	84	82	86	84	83
Selected	17	18	13	12	16	18	14	16	17
N	1000	628	121	164	87	697	303	540	460

		Family Income			Party ID		
	All	<u>Under 50K</u>	<u>50K-100K</u>	<u>100K+</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Independent</u>
Not selected	83	84	81	85	90	77	81
Selected	17	16	19	15	10	23	19
N	1000	416	293	191	370	297	260

		Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
	All	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Biden</u>	<u>Trump</u>	<u>Neither</u>
Not selected	83	92	86	73	93	71	87
Selected	17	8	14	27	7	29	13
N	1000	291	327	326	390	375	235

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of everyone.]

5) When you think about immigrants to the United States, which of the following statements do you **GENERALLY** agree with? Choose all that apply.

Our political leaders in Washington, D.C., have intentionally failed to reduce undocumented immigrations because they want more immigrants to enter the country

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

		Age					Gender	
	All	<u>18-29</u>	<u>30-44</u>	<u>45-54</u>	<u>55-64</u>	<u>65+</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>
Not selected	64	76	71	59	53	54	66	61
Selected	36	24	29	41	47	46	34	39
N	1000	210	252	150	176	212	513	487

		Race				Education		Marital Status	
	All	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Hispanic</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Less Than College</u>	<u>College</u>	<u>Not Married</u>	<u>Married</u>
Not selected	64	56	84	76	67	63	65	70	56
Selected	36	44	16	24	33	37	35	30	44
N	1000	628	121	164	87	697	303	540	460

		Family Income			Party ID		
	All	<u>Under 50K</u>	<u>50K-100K</u>	<u>100K+</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Independent</u>
Not selected	64	65	64	62	87	36	63
Selected	36	35	36	38	13	64	37
N	1000	416	293	191	370	297	260

		Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
	All	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Biden</u>	<u>Trump</u>	<u>Neither</u>
Not selected	64	93	72	29	91	33	68
Selected	36	7	28	71	9	67	32
N	1000	291	327	326	390	375	235

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of everyone.]

5) When you think about immigrants to the United States, which of the following statements do you **GENERALLY** agree with? Choose all that apply.

I do not generally agree with any of the statements above [see previous four pages]

*Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents*

		Age					Gender	
	All	18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Not selected	50	48	48	48	56	50	47	53
Selected	50	52	52	52	44	50	53	47
N	1000	210	252	150	176	212	513	487

		Race				Education		Marital Status	
	All	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
Not selected	50	55	37	40	47	52	46	45	56
Selected	50	45	63	60	53	48	54	55	44
N	1000	628	121	164	87	697	303	540	460

		Family Income			Party ID		
	All	Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Not selected	50	48	53	49	29	78	49
Selected	50	52	47	51	71	22	51
N	1000	416	293	191	370	297	260

		Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Not selected	50	20	46	81	23	80	47
Selected	50	80	54	19	77	20	53
N	1000	291	327	326	390	375	235

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

6) In recent years, some people have expressed concern that federal government law enforcement agencies like the Department of Justice and the IRS have been used by [opponents of preferred party: Democratic Party/Republican Party] leaders in Washington, D.C., to target [preferred party: Republican Party/Democratic Party] leaders and supporters, while protecting their own. When you think about politics and the law, would you agree or disagree with the following?

a) [Preferred party: Democrats/ Republicans] harm themselves if they comply with the law when [opponents of preferred party: Republicans/Democrats] do not

Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents

	Age						Gender	
	All	18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Strongly agree	9	11	6	9	9	12	6	13
Agree	24	34	27	17	17	23	20	28
Neither agree nor disagree	36	35	38	33	44	31	41	32
Disagree	21	15	23	27	21	23	24	19
Strongly disagree	9	4	6	13	10	11	9	8
N	765	143	177	121	145	179	382	383

	Race					Education		Marital Status	
	All	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
Strongly agree	9	8	6	17	9	9	10	9	10
Agree	24	26	22	19	22	23	25	22	26
Neither agree nor disagree	36	32	47	42	43	40	29	40	33
Disagree	21	25	16	16	13	20	25	21	22
Strongly disagree	9	9	9	6	13	8	10	8	9
N	765	498	86	113	68	523	242	399	366

	Family Income				Party ID		
	All	Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Strongly agree	9	9	8	10	7	13	8
Agree	24	20	26	28	25	28	17
Neither agree nor disagree	36	43	33	29	33	35	41
Disagree	21	21	23	23	25	18	22
Strongly disagree	9	7	9	10	10	5	12
N	765	313	227	158	303	261	168

	Ideology			Would Vote For ...			
	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Strongly agree	9	7	7	14	6	13	NA
Agree	24	24	22	27	22	26	NA
Neither agree nor disagree	36	30	41	36	34	39	NA
Disagree	21	27	20	18	26	17	NA
Strongly disagree	9	12	10	5	12	6	NA
N	765	233	240	273	390	375	NA

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

6) In recent years, some people have expressed concern that federal government law enforcement agencies like the Department of Justice and the IRS have been used by [opponents of preferred party: Democratic Party/Republican Party] leaders in Washington, D.C., to target [preferred party: Republican Party/Democratic Party] leaders and supporters, while protecting their own. When you think about politics and the law, would you agree or disagree with the following?

b) I would trust [preferred candidate: Joe Biden/Donald Trump] as president to decide when to follow the law and when to ignore it to achieve justice

Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents

	All	Age					Gender	
		18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Strongly agree	16	12	12	15	19	20	17	15
Agree	30	36	33	29	27	23	29	30
Neither agree nor disagree	34	35	34	31	35	32	35	32
Disagree	15	14	16	15	15	15	14	16
Strongly disagree	6	2	5	9	5	9	6	6
N	765	143	177	121	145	179	382	383

	All	Race				Education		Marital Status	
		White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
Strongly agree	16	16	18	12	14	16	15	17	15
Agree	30	28	35	34	27	30	29	28	32
Neither agree nor disagree	34	32	34	38	36	34	33	35	32
Disagree	15	16	8	13	17	14	17	14	17
Strongly disagree	6	7	5	2	6	6	6	7	5
N	765	498	86	113	68	523	242	399	366

	All	Family Income			Party ID		
		Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Strongly agree	16	17	14	16	16	20	10
Agree	30	29	31	34	34	29	23
Neither agree nor disagree	34	35	30	32	30	31	43
Disagree	15	14	18	13	15	15	15
Strongly disagree	6	6	8	5	5	5	8
N	765	313	227	158	303	261	168

	All	Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
		Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Strongly agree	16	12	15	20	15	16	NA
Agree	30	34	29	28	32	27	NA
Neither agree nor disagree	34	29	37	32	31	37	NA
Disagree	15	17	13	16	15	15	NA
Strongly disagree	6	8	6	4	7	5	NA
N	765	233	240	273	390	375	NA

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

Appendix

[Asked of those who would vote for Biden or Trump.]

7) Do you agree or disagree with the following?

If [*preferred candidate*: Joe Biden/Donald Trump] is elected president and can't get cooperation from [*opponents of preferred candidate's party*: Democratic/Republican] members of Congress to pass new laws, President [*preferred candidate*: Biden/Trump] should circumvent Congress and issue executive orders on his own to accomplish his priorities.

Percentage responses by various subgroups
Rows beginning with "N" show the number of respondents

		Age					Gender	
	All	18-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Female	Male
Strongly agree	13	11	15	10	13	14	10	15
Agree	28	36	24	31	23	27	28	28
Neither agree nor disagree	31	31	33	22	40	29	35	28
Disagree	20	17	20	26	18	21	18	22
Strongly disagree	8	5	8	11	6	9	9	6
N	765	143	177	121	145	179	382	383

		Race				Education		Marital Status	
	All	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Less Than College	College	Not Married	Married
Strongly agree	13	11	13	20	12	14	10	14	11
Agree	28	27	38	23	28	27	29	27	29
Neither agree nor disagree	31	30	31	33	37	31	32	33	29
Disagree	20	25	16	11	10	20	20	18	23
Strongly disagree	8	7	2	13	12	7	8	8	8
N	765	498	86	113	68	523	242	399	366

		Family Income			Party ID		
	All	Under 50K	50K-100K	100K+	Democrat	Republican	Independent
Strongly agree	13	12	14	14	14	13	10
Agree	28	27	24	33	31	31	21
Neither agree nor disagree	31	34	32	22	31	27	34
Disagree	20	18	24	21	16	21	24
Strongly disagree	8	8	7	10	7	8	10
N	765	313	227	158	303	261	168

		Ideology			Would Vote For ...		
	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Biden	Trump	Neither
Strongly agree	13	11	12	15	13	12	NA
Agree	28	31	28	25	29	26	NA
Neither agree nor disagree	31	35	30	28	32	31	NA
Disagree	20	17	20	25	18	23	NA
Strongly disagree	8	6	10	7	8	8	NA
N	765	233	240	273	390	375	NA

Note: The figures above are percentages except those in the row appearing at the bottom of each table and beginning with the letter N. These rows show the frequency, or number, of respondents in each column. The frequencies are weighted and rounded to the nearest whole number. The sum of the frequencies of the various subgroups may not equal the frequency of all the respondents due to rounding, to missing data or to excluded respondents (the subgroups shown may not be comprehensive). Percentages in each column may not sum to precisely 100 due to rounding.

About the Author

Thomas Shull is survey research director for the Institute for the Study of Modern Authoritarianism and editor-at-large for ISMA's web publication, *The UnPopulist*. His career as a writer, editor and analyst has included serving on the editorial board of *The Detroit News*, working as a senior analyst on the former NBC/*Wall Street Journal* Survey of public opinion, and acting as senior editor, and later as senior director of research quality, at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy in Michigan.

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